Skhirat Agreement Libya

Several other factors contributed to the perception that an agreement was needed quickly. One of them was concern about the expansion of IS in Libya, especially after the Paris attacks in November. Some [fn]Crisis Group e-mail exchange, senior UN official, December 2015. A similar fear was that if the opportunity not to seize Daesh continued to attract international attention, anti-IS operations would refocus on Syria and Iraq and the momentum of action in Libya would be lost. Interview with the crisis group, senior UNSMIL official, Brussels, December 2015.Unity states felt that a unity government was essential to coordinate a military response to the conquest of territory in central Lebanon and elsewhere by ISIS. In early 2016, U.S. officials estimated that there were between 4,000 and 6,000 IS supporters in Libya, mainly in Sirte, but also in Benghazi, Derna and Sabratha. [fn] U.S. general: number of ISIS fighters in Libya doubles, CNN, April 8, 2016.Hide Footnote Explains the reasons for the progress of the Skhirat agreement, said a senior U.S. official: despite the first agreements that were reached, the Libyan House of Representatives based in Tobruk voted against the authorization of the GNA in the summer of 2016 and was its rival for the libye. [33] In the first months of 2017, cooperation between the two governments has completely collapsed.

In February, a meeting was held in Cairo between Field Marshal Khalifa Hafter and Prime Minister Sarray, but despite Egyptian and Russian pressure, the two sides failed to reach an agreement. [34] In March, the benghazi pro-GNA defence brigades took control of the oil facilities in the Gulf of Sidra by the Libyan National Army of the Eastern Parliament, which had conquered them as early as September 2016. The LNA launched a counter-attack and the Tobruk government urged the GNA to condemn its actions. The Libyan House of Representatives then withdrew the GNA`s recognition and called for new elections to be held by early 2018. [35] [36] This did not work: Haftar`s troops continued to dominate and, despite the Council`s juicy payments to Jadran to reopen the oil terminals, exports did not resume. [fn] In June 2016, the Council gave the Jadran Presidency at least 40 million dinars ($28 million) to cover the salaries of its men; He is said to have demanded an extra 120 million dinars. Interview with crisis group, Mustafa Sanallah, President of the National Oil Corporation, Tripoli, 5 June 2016. Sanallah repeatedly warned the Council not to co-opt Jadran and publicly urged Kobler to visit him on 21 July 2016 in Ras Lanuf. Crisis Group telephone interview, July 25, 2016. According to Council member Musa al-Koni, the Council and Jadran signed an agreement in July on oil exports from the ports under guard control, in exchange for 24 months of additional payments for all Guards employees (the 40 million was a first tranche) and unspecified investments for communities in oil-producing and export-oriented areas. Interview with the Crisis Group, Tunis, 2 September 2016. Koni expressed doubts about the oil leak.

The conquest of Sirte`s main golf courses in September 2016, which forced Jadran and his allies to withdraw, opened the possibility of a long battle for control of resources and another consolidated leverage of anti-Agreement forces. Haftar should also look again at ourselves, especially with his security team, in order to reach a broad consensus on a possible security dialogue. The priorities of any political solution should be a compromise under Article 8, particularly with regard to the army and police chains of command, and be the subject of consensus on a single security force. Disagreements, including who will lead the army and which Islamist groups should be fought (only Daesh and Al Qaeda or groups that have collaborated with them), can be overcome by ensuring that important military representatives from both sides are seated around the table.

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